Negativity bias: the impact of framing of immigration on welfare state support in Germany, Sweden and the UK by Avdagic, Sabina & Savage, Lee
Negativity bias: the impact of framing of immigration on 
welfare state support in Germany, Sweden and the UK
Article  (Accepted Version)
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk
Avdagic, Sabina and Savage, Lee (2019) Negativity bias: the impact of framing of immigration on 
welfare state support in Germany, Sweden and the UK. British Journal of Political Science. ISSN 
0007-1234 (Accepted) 
This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/84342/
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the 
published  version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to 
consult the publisher’s version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published 
version. 
Copyright and reuse: 
Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University.
Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material 
made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available. 
Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third 
parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic 
details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the 
















































































4.1	Regression	models	To	formally	test	our	hypotheses,	we	regressed	our	dependent	variable	on	a	categorical	indicator	of	a	respondent’s	treatment	group.	The	control	group	is	specified	as	the	reference	category.	As	the	dependent	variable	is	categorical,	we	use	an	ordered	logit	model	with	poststratification	weights.	Given	the	experimental	protocol	and	the	fact	that	our	samples	are	weighted	to	be	representative,	spurious	correlation	is	unlikely	to	be	a	problem	in	our	models.	We	therefore	follow	advice	by	Mutz	(2011,	Ch.	7)	to	keep	the	model	simple	and	not	to	include	control	variables.12	In	subsequent	models,	which	examine	the	moderating	effects	of	pre-existing	attitudes,	we	interact	those	attitudes	with	the	treatment.	The	models	are	specified	as	follows:				 𝑌"∗ = 	𝛽' +	𝛽)𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇	𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃 +	𝜀" 		with	𝑌"∗	capturing	individuals’	support	for	increased	welfare	spending,	𝑖	indexing	individuals,	and	𝜀" 	representing	an	error	term.	To	examine	the	conditional	effect	of	pre-
																																																													12	The	results	hold	when	standard	controls	are	included	in	the	models	(see	table	A1	in	the	online	appendix).	
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existing	attitudes	on	our	treatments,	additional	models	are	estimated	containing	the	interaction	terms	𝛽6𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇	𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃	 × 𝐴𝑁𝑇𝐼-𝑊𝐸𝐿𝐹𝐴𝑅𝐸,	𝛽<𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇	𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃	 ×𝐴𝑁𝑇𝐼-𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁,	and	𝛽=𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇	𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃 × 𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑂𝑀𝐼𝐶	𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌.	The	interaction	models	also	contain	all	constitutive	terms.	Separate	models	are	estimated	for	each	country.	The	results	can	be	found	in	Tables	1-3.			 	
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Table	1:	Immigration	Framing	and	Support	for	Redistribution	in	Germany		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)		 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	No	frame	(ref.)	 	 	 	 				Negative	frame	 -0.3688***	 -0.1419	 -0.3556***	 -0.2573**		 (0.0735)	 (0.0951)	 (0.0825)	 (0.0954)				Positive	frame	 -0.1360	 -0.0525	 -0.0984	 -0.1229		 (0.0698)	 (0.0915)	 (0.0781)	 (0.0915)	Anti-welfare	 	 -0.6247***	 	 		 	 (0.1015)	 	 	Negative	frame	X	Anti-welfare	 	 -0.4889**	 	 		 	 (0.1503)	 	 	Positive	frame	X	Anti-welfare	 	 -0.2005	 	 		 	 (0.1433)	 	 	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.5612***	 		 	 	 (0.1187)	 	Negative	frame	X	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.0541	 		 	 	 (0.1831)	 	Positive	frame	X	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.1837	 		 	 	 (0.1757)	 	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 0.1803		 	 	 	 (0.0996)	Negative	frame	X	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 -0.2863		 	 	 	 (0.1492)	Positive	frame	X	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 -0.0246		 	 	 	 (0.1413)	cut1	 	 	 	 	Constant	 -0.5964***	 -0.9086***	 -0.7312***	 -0.5237***		 (0.0519)	 (0.0679)	 (0.0590)	 (0.0669)	cut2	 	 	 	 	Constant	 0.7173***	 0.4628***	 0.6042***	 0.7917***		 (0.0522)	 (0.0669)	 (0.0585)	 (0.0675)	
N	 4158	 4158	 4158	 4158	AIC	 2.176	 2.124	 2.156	 2.176	BIC	 -25575.8	 -25773.7	 -25637.2	 -25557.5	Ordered	logit	regressions,	coefficients	are	log	odds	with	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001	
20 
	
Table	2:	Immigration	Framing	and	Support	for	Redistribution	in	Sweden		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)		 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	No	frame	(ref.)	 	 	 	 				Negative	frame	 -0.6128***	 -0.5038***	 -0.5025***	 -0.5618***		 (0.1128)	 (0.1432)	 (0.1318)	 (0.1437)				Positive	frame	 -0.2173*	 -0.1873	 -0.0424	 -0.1020		 (0.1053)	 (0.1322)	 (0.1265)	 (0.1299)	Anti-welfare	 	 -1.3987***	 	 		 	 (0.1669)	 	 	Negative	frame	X	Anti-welfare	 	 -0.6012*	 	 		 	 (0.2665)	 	 	Positive	frame	X	Anti-welfare	 	 -0.4034	 	 		 	 (0.2422)	 	 	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.5933***	 		 	 	 (0.1668)	 	Negative	frame	X	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.5907*	 		 	 	 (0.2786)	 	Positive	frame	X	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.5942*	 		 	 	 (0.2370)	 	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 0.1342		 	 	 	 (0.1568)	Negative	frame	X	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 -0.1344		 	 	 	 (0.2306)	Positive	frame	X	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 -0.3095		 	 	 	 (0.2217)	cut1	 	 	 	 	Constant	 -0.5027***	 -1.0873***	 -0.6833***	 -0.4520***		 (0.0793)	 (0.1065)	 (0.0964)	 (0.0984)	cut2	 	 	 	 	Constant	 0.7779***	 0.3685***	 0.6497***	 0.8297***		 (0.0810)	 (0.1017)	 (0.0960)	 (0.1005)	
N	 2001	 2001	 2001	 2001	AIC	 2.161	 1.991	 2.109	 2.163	BIC	 -10863.6	 -11186.8	 -10951.9	 -10843.1	Ordered	logit	regressions,	coefficients	are	log	odds	with	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001	
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Table	3:	Immigration	Framing	and	Support	for	Redistribution	in	the	UK		 (9)	 (10)	 (11)	 (12)		 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	No	frame	(ref.)	 	 	 	 				Negative	frame	 -0.6335***	 -0.4679***	 -0.4792***	 -0.4167***		 (0.0899)	 (0.1191)	 (0.1120)	 (0.1178)				Positive	frame	 -0.1417	 -0.1737	 -0.1637	 -0.1210		 (0.0866)	 (0.1171)	 (0.1114)	 (0.1178)	Anti-welfare	 	 -1.1057***	 	 		 	 (0.1325)	 	 	Negative	frame	X	Anti-welfare	 	 -0.5540**	 	 		 	 (0.1922)	 	 	Positive	frame	X	Anti-welfare	 	 -0.0664	 	 		 	 (0.1837)	 	 	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.7993***	 		 	 	 (0.1329)	 	Negative	frame	X	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.6360**	 		 	 	 (0.1989)	 	Positive	frame	X	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 0.0688	 		 	 	 (0.1833)	 	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 0.5522***		 	 	 	 (0.1266)	Negative	frame	X	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 -0.5183**		 	 	 	 (0.1821)	Positive	frame	X	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 -0.1148		 	 	 	 (0.1746)	cut1	 	 	 	 	Constant	 -0.9426***	 -1.4852***	 -1.2653***	 -0.7150***		 (0.0670)	 (0.0918)	 (0.0850)	 (0.0853)	cut2	 	 	 	 	Constant	 0.0850	 -0.3505***	 -0.1800*	 0.3225***		 (0.0638)	 (0.0857)	 (0.0801)	 (0.0837)	











Table	4.	Manipulation	check	frequencies	(%)			 Negative	frame	 Positive	frame	 No	frame	No	 57.73	 46.28	 54.15	Yes	 42.27	 53.72	 45.85	





















































Table	A1:	Immigration	Framing	and	Welfare	Support	(with	controls)		 Germany	 	 Sweden	 	 UK		 b/se	 	 b/se	 	 b/se	No	frame	(ref)	 	 	 	 	 	Negative	frame	 -0.3505***	 	 -0.7367***	 	 -0.7843***		 (0.0748)	 	 (0.1244)	 	 (0.0985)	Positive	frame	 -0.1183	 	 -0.2752*	 	 -0.1407		 (0.0708)	 	 (0.1167)	 	 (0.0936)	Age	(18-24	ref)	 0.0000	 Age	 0.0065	 Age	 0.0117**	25-34	 -0.1401	 	 (0.0043)	 	 (0.0038)		 (0.1421)	 Male	 -0.1275	 Female	 -0.1369	35-44	 -0.1813	 	 (0.1028)	 	 (0.0810)	
	 (0.1499)	 Education	level	(elementary,	ref)	 	 Education	level	(no	qualifications,	ref)	 	45-54	 -0.2991*	 Secondary	 0.1572	 Vocational	 0.0880		 (0.1462)	 	 (0.2194)	 	 (0.1846)	Over	55	 -0.2237	 Post-secondary	 0.2564	 Secondary	 -0.0627		 (0.1396)	 	 (0.2723)	 	 (0.1672)	Female	 -0.3985***	 Post-secondary	vocational	 -0.0563	 Tertiary	 0.3113		 (0.0619)	 	 (0.2549)	 	 (0.1645)	Education	level	 	 University,	1-2y	 0.2131	 Don’t	know	 -0.4064	(no	qualification,	ref)	 	 	 (0.2486)	 	 (0.2680)	Still	in	training	 0.0860	 University,	3-4y	 0.4893*	 Work	status	(full	time,	ref)	 		 (0.2561)	 	 (0.2282)	 Part-time	8-29h	p/w	 0.2814*	Still	studying	 -0.0987	 University,	5y+	 0.1346	 	 (0.1194)		 (0.2078)	 	 (0.2458)	 Part-time	<	8h	p/w	 0.4485	Vocational	degree	 -0.1349	 Doctorate	 -0.4536	 	 (0.3016)		 (0.1423)	 	 (0.5417)	 Full	time	student	 0.9086***	University	or	higher	 0.0351	 Rather	not	say	 -0.1074	 	 (0.1972)		 (0.1509)	 	 (0.4880)	 retired	 0.4092**	Refused	to	say	 0.0022	 Work	status		 	 	 (0.1345)		 (0.1749)	 Full	time	 0.0264	 Unemployed	 0.5983*	Work	status	(full	time,	ref)	 	 	 (0.2624)	 	 (0.2369)		 	 Part	time	8-29h	p/w	 0.3075	 Not	working	 0.8413***	
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Part	time	8-29	h	p/w	 0.1894	 	 (0.2701)	 	 (0.1549)		 (0.1142)	 Part	time	<	8h	p/w	 0.6184*	 Past	vote	(Conservatives,	ref)	 	Part	time	<	8h	p/w	 -0.3821	 	 (0.2751)	 Labour	 1.8369***		 (0.3209)	 Studying	 0.1071	 	 (0.1017)	Not	working	 0.3472***	 	 (0.2446)	 Liberal	Democrats	 1.5865***		 (0.0710)	 Pensioner	 -0.2314	 	 (0.1595)	Other		 -0.2529	 	 (0.2803)	 SNP	 2.0325***		 (0.7361)	 Seeking	work	 -0.3868	 	 (0.2249)	Past	vote	(CDU/CSU,	ref)	 	 	 (0.3431)	 Plaid	Cymru	 0.3541	SPD	 0.4355***	 Does	not	work	at	all	 0.5178	 	 (0.5209)		 (0.0920)	 	 (0.4916)	 UKIP	 0.5165*	Die	Linke	 0.4515**	 Past	vote	(Moderates,	ref)	 	 	 (0.2550)		 (0.1390)	 	 	 Green	 1.8621***	Gruene	 0.8502***	 Centre	Party	 0.7763**	 	 (0.3361)		 (0.1309)	 	 (0.2978)	 Other	 0.3784	FDP	 -0.5826**	 Liberals	 0.4764	 	 (0.4014)		 (0.2009)	 	 (0.2531)	 Don’t	know	 0.2198	AfD	 -0.8889***	 Christian	Democrats	 0.6209*	 	 (0.4003)		 (0.1830)	 	 (0.2885)	 Not	asked	 0.7742***	Other	 -0.0547	 Greens	 2.0849***	 	 (0.1290)		 (0.1645)	 	 (0.2262)	 	 	Non-voter	 0.0486	 Social	Democrats	 1.9012***	 	 		 (0.0815)	 	 (0.1529)	 	 		 	 Left	Party	 2.8296***	 	 		 	 	 (0.2297)	 	 		 	 Feminist	Initiative	 3.1209***	 	 		 	 	 (0.3800)	 	 		 	 Sweden	Democrats	 -0.7365***	 	 		 	 	 (0.1808)	 	 		 	 Other	 1.6851**	 	 		 	 	 (0.6147)	 	 		 	 Non-voter	 0.6989*	 		 		 	 	 (0.2941)	 	 		 	 None	of	the	above	 0.5238	 	 	
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	 	 	 (0.3561)	 	 		 	 No	right	to	vote	 1.6036***	 	 		 	 	 (0.2834)	 	 		 	 Don’t	know	 1.2064***	 	 		 	 	 (0.3120)	 	 		 	 Don’t	want	to	say	 0.9988***	 	 		 	 	 (0.1776)	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	cut1	 -0.7685***	 	 0.8772*	 	 0.7682**		 (0.2005)	 	 (0.4221)	 	 (0.2727)		 	 	 	 	 	cut2	 0.5974**	 	 2.4750***	 	 1.9832***		 (0.2002)	 	 (0.4260)	 	 (0.2759)	
N	 4158	 	 2001	 	 3191	Log	likelihood	 -4417.446	 	 -1879.471	 	 -3043.3224	*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001	Note:	Differences	in	categories	are	due	to	different	questions	asked	(or	the	way	in	which	questions	are	coded)	in	the	YouGov	Omnibus	in	the	respective	countries.	The	vote	in	the	last	elections	is	taken	as	a	proxy	for	political	leaning.	The	results	are	unaffected	if	party	id	is	used	instead.		 	
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Table	A2.	Pairwise	contrasts	of	treatment	groups		 (i) Germany	Treatment	group	 Contrast	 Std.	error	 Sig.	 95%	conf	interval	Positive	vs	negative	 	 .2328031	 .0735468	 0.005	 .0567335					 .4088727	Control	vs	negative		 .3688177	 .0735311	 0.000	 		.1927857					 .5448496	Control	vs	positive	 .1360146	 .0697729	 0.154	 -.0310203					 	.3030495		 (ii) Sweden	Treatment	group	 Contrast	 Std.	error	 Sig.	 95%	conf	interval	Positive	vs	negative	 	 .3955124	 .1106948	 0.001	 .1305112					 .6605136	Control	vs	negative		 .6128006	 .1128207	 0.000	 		.3427101					 .8828912	Control	vs	positive	 .2172882	 .1052672	 0.117	 -.0347195					 	.4692959		 (iii) United	Kingdom	Treatment	group	 Contrast	 Std.	error	 Sig.	 95%	conf	interval	Positive	vs	negative		 .4918099	 .0881157	 0.000	 .2808626					 .7027572	Control	vs	negative		 .6335371	 .0899221	 0.000	 .4182655					 .8488087	Control	vs	positive	 .1417272	 .0866312	 0.306	 -.0656661	 		.3491205				 	
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Table	A3.	Manipulation	check	–	logit	results		 		 b/se	Positive	frame	(ref.)	 				Negative	frame	 -0.461**		 (0.148)				No	frame	 -0.293*		 (0.149)	Constant	 0.065		 (0.106)	N	 1304	Log-likelihood	 -885.978	*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001	Note:	dependent	variable	is	the	question:	“Do	you	believe	that,	on	average,	immigrants	contribute	more	in	taxes	and	national	insurance	than	they	receive	in	benefits	and	services	from	the	welfare	state?”.	Responses	are	coded:	0	“No,	immigrants	cost	more	than	they	contribute”	and	1	“Yes,	immigrants	contribute	more	than	they	cost”.	Fieldwork	carried	out	by	YouGov,	February	20th-21st	2019.		 	
50 
Table	A4:	Immigration	Framing	and	Support	for	Social	Spending	in	Germany	–	reduced	sample		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)		 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	No	frame	(ref.)	 	 	 	 				Negative	frame	 -0.341**	 -0.079	 -0.285*	 -0.260		 (0.105)	 (0.136)	 (0.120)	 (0.137)				Positive	frame	 -0.148	 0.020	 -0.122	 -0.199		 (0.101)	 (0.132)	 (0.114)	 (0.131)	Anti-welfare	 	 -0.681***	 	 		 	 (0.145)	 	 	Negative	frame	X	Anti-welfare	 	 -0.638**	 	 		 	 (0.217)	 	 	Positive	frame	X	Anti-welfare	 	 -0.327	 	 		 	 (0.207)	 	 	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.614***	 		 	 	 (0.160)	 	Negative	frame	X	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.253	 		 	 	 (0.255)	 	Positive	frame	X	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.131	 		 	 	 (0.247)	 	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 0.028		 	 	 	 (0.141)	Negative	frame	X	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 -0.213		 	 	 	 (0.213)	Positive	frame	X	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 0.139		 	 	 	 (0.205)		 	 	 	 	cut1	 -0.610***	 -0.960***	 -0.759***	 -0.599***		 (0.074)	 (0.096)	 (0.085)	 (0.095)	cut2	 0.667***	 0.396***	 0.546***	 0.679***		 (0.074)	 (0.094)	 (0.084)	 (0.095)	N	 2001	 2001	 2001	 2001	Log-likelihood	 -2178.452	 -2104.763	 -2150.872	 -2177.048	AIC	 4364.905	 4223.526	 4315.744	 4368.096	*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001	Note:	N	reduced	to	correspond	to	the	Swedish	sample.					 	
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Table	A5:	Immigration	Framing	and	Support	for	Social	Spending	in	United	Kingdom	–	reduced	sample		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)		 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	No	frame	(ref.)	 	 	 	 				Negative	frame	 -0.628***	 -0.436**	 -0.375**	 -0.424**		 (0.114)	 (0.152)	 (0.140)	 (0.150)				Positive	frame	 -0.073	 -0.062	 -0.071	 -0.045		 (0.113)	 (0.153)	 (0.144)	 (0.152)	Anti-welfare	 	 -0.940***	 	 		 	 (0.169)	 	 	Negative	frame	X	Anti-welfare	 	 -0.621*	 	 		 	 (0.242)	 	 	Positive	frame	X	Anti-welfare	 	 -0.280	 	 		 	 (0.241)	 	 	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.574***	 		 	 	 (0.171)	 	Negative	frame	X	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.912***	 		 	 	 (0.255)	 	Positive	frame	X	Anti-immigrant	 	 	 -0.028	 		 	 	 (0.242)	 	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 0.574***		 	 	 	 (0.162)	Negative	frame	X	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 -0.506*		 	 	 	 (0.230)	Positive	frame	X	Economic	insecurity	 	 	 	 -0.148		 	 	 	 (0.229)		 	 	 	 	cut1	 -0.889***	 -1.369***	 -1.123***	 -0.660***		 (0.085)	 (0.119)	 (0.106)	 (0.108)	cut2	 0.106	 -0.281*	 -0.079	 0.346**		 (0.081)	 (0.111)	 (0.101)	 (0.107)	N	 2001	 2001	 2001	 2001	Log-likelihood	 -2083.588	 -1981.251	 -2026.437	 -2071.839	AIC	 4175.176	 3976.501	 4066.875	 4157.679	*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001	Note:		N	reduced	to	correspond	to	the	Swedish	sample.
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Table	A6:	Germany	-	treatment	group	balance		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)		 Age	 Gender	 Past	vote	 Education	 Work	status		 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	
Negative	frame	group	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	18-24	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	25-34	 -0.066	 	 	 	 		 (0.167)	 	 	 	 	35-44	 0.157	 	 	 	 		 (0.169)	 	 	 	 	45-54	 0.064	 	 	 	 		 (0.161)	 	 	 	 	Over	55	 0.126	 	 	 	 		 (0.146)	 	 	 	 	Female	 	 0.124	 	 	 		 	 (0.079)	 	 	 	CDU/CSU	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	SPD	 	 	 -0.257*	 	 		 	 	 (0.116)	 	 	Die	Linke	 	 	 -0.139	 	 		 	 	 (0.169)	 	 	Grüne	 	 	 -0.064	 	 		 	 	 (0.168)	 	 	FDP	 	 	 0.136	 	 		 	 	 (0.217)	 	 	AfD	 	 	 0.095	 	 		 	 	 (0.226)	 	 	Other	 	 	 -0.317	 	 		 	 	 (0.206)	 	 	Non-voter	 	 	 -0.235*	 	 		 	 	 (0.104)	 	 	No	qualifications	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	Still	training	 	 	 	 0.274	 		 	 	 	 (0.328)	 	Still	studying	 	 	 	 0.427	 		 	 	 	 (0.280)	 	Vocational	degree	 	 	 	 0.277	 		 	 	 	 (0.207)	 	University	or	higher	degree	 	 	 	 0.292	 		 	 	 	 (0.213)	 	Full-time	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	P/T	8-29	hours	p/w	 	 	 	 	 -0.096		 	 	 	 	 (0.146)	P/T	less	than	8	hours	p/w	 	 	 	 	 0.216		 	 	 	 	 (0.422)	Not	working	 	 	 	 	 -0.090		 	 	 	 	 (0.084)	Constant	 -0.113	 -0.099	 0.107	 -0.311	 0.017	
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	 (0.133)	 (0.057)	 (0.076)	 (0.200)	 (0.065)	
Positive	frame	group	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	18-24	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	25-34	 0.247	 	 	 	 		 (0.166)	 	 	 	 	35-44	 0.383*	 	 	 	 		 (0.170)	 	 	 	 	45-54	 0.089	 	 	 	 		 (0.164)	 	 	 	 	Over	55	 0.275	 	 	 	 		 (0.148)	 	 	 	 	Female	 	 0.060	 	 	 		 	 (0.078)	 	 	 	CDU/CSU	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	SPD	 	 	 -0.149	 	 		 	 	 (0.117)	 	 	Die	Linke	 	 	 -0.050	 	 		 	 	 (0.168)	 	 	Grüne	 	 	 -0.105	 	 		 	 	 (0.174)	 	 	FDP	 	 	 0.038	 	 		 	 	 (0.227)	 	 	AfD	 	 	 0.230	 	 		 	 	 (0.228)	 	 	Other	 	 	 0.036	 	 		 	 	 (0.193)	 	 	Non-voter	 	 	 -0.026	 	 		 	 	 (0.103)	 	 	No	qualifications	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	Still	training	 	 	 	 0.433	 		 	 	 	 (0.309)	 	Still	studying	 	 	 	 0.429	 		 	 	 	 (0.279)	 	Vocational	degree	 	 	 	 0.318	 		 	 	 	 (0.204)	 	University	or	higher	degree	 	 	 	 0.204	 		 	 	 	 (0.212)	 	Full-time	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	P/T	8-29	hours	p/w	 	 	 	 	 -0.113		 	 	 	 	 (0.146)	P/T	less	than	8	hours	p/w	 	 	 	 	 -0.218		 	 	 	 	 (0.445)	Not	working	 	 	 	 	 -0.051		 	 	 	 	 (0.084)	Constant	 -0.253	 -0.058	 0.006	 -0.312	 0.010		 (0.136)	 (0.055)	 (0.077)	 (0.198)	 (0.065)	N	 4158	 4158	 4158	 3661	 4147	Log-likelihood	 -4561.03	 -4566.16	 -4559.85	 -3992.07	 -4553.33	*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001	
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Table	A7:	SWE	-	treatment	group	balance		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)		 Age	 Gender	 Past	vote	 Education	 Work	status		 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	
Negative	frame	group	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	Age	 -0.002	 	 	 	 		 (0.004)	 	 	 	 	Male	 	 -0.173	 	 	 		 	 (0.117)	 	 	 	Moderates	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	Centre	Party	 	 	 -0.063	 	 		 	 	 (0.359)	 	 	Liberals		 	 	 -0.385	 	 		 	 	 (0.285)	 	 	Christian	Democrats	 	 	 -0.100	 	 		 	 	 (0.337)	 	 	Greens	 	 	 0.041	 	 		 	 	 (0.275)	 	 	Social	Democrats	 	 	 0.042	 	 		 	 	 (0.185)	 	 	Left	Party	 	 	 0.068	 	 		 	 	 (0.277)	 	 	Feminist	Initiative	 	 	 -0.007	 	 		 	 	 (0.352)	 	 	Sweden	Democrats	 	 	 0.146	 	 		 	 	 (0.187)	 	 	Other	 	 	 -0.076	 	 		 	 	 (0.490)	 	 	Non-voter	 	 	 -0.285	 	 		 	 	 (0.359)	 	 	None	of	the	above	 	 	 -0.121	 	 		 	 	 (0.469)	 	 	No	right	to	vote	 	 	 0.519	 	 		 	 	 (0.342)	 	 	Don’t	know	 	 	 -0.202	 	 		 	 	 (0.487)	 	 	Don’t	want	to	say	 	 	 0.163	 	 		 	 	 (0.254)	 	 	Elementary	school	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	Secondary	school	 	 	 	 0.099	 		 	 	 	 (0.239)	 	Post-secondary	 	 	 	 -0.304	 		 	 	 	 (0.316)	 	Post-secondary	vocational	 	 	 	 0.253	 		 	 	 	 (0.288)	 	University,	1-2	years	 	 	 	 -0.166	 		 	 	 	 (0.290)	 	University,	3-4	years	 	 	 	 -0.280	 		 	 	 	 (0.250)	 	
55 
University,	5	years	or	more	 	 	 	 -0.133	 		 	 	 	 (0.272)	 	Doctorate	 	 	 	 0.298	 		 	 	 	 (0.533)	 	Rather	not	say	 	 	 	 -0.140	 		 	 	 	 (0.661)	 	Working	full-time	 	 	 	 	 -0.029		 	 	 	 	 (0.326)	Working	part-time	(8-29	hours)	 	 	 	 	 -0.113		 	 	 	 	 (0.324)	Working	part-time	(less	than	8	hours)	 	 	 	 	 -0.616		 	 	 	 	 (0.342)	Student	 	 	 	 	 0.248		 	 	 	 	 (0.289)	Pensioner	 	 	 	 	 -0.080		 	 	 	 	 (0.330)	Seeking	work	 	 	 	 	 0.027		 	 	 	 	 (0.442)	Does	not	work	at	all	 	 	 	 	 -0.274		 	 	 	 	 (0.605)	Constant	 0.016	 0.016	 -0.093	 -0.017	 -0.012		 (0.181)	 (0.082)	 (0.136)	 (0.216)	 (0.323)	
Positive	frame	group	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	Age	 -0.003	 	 	 	 		 (0.004)	 	 	 	 	Male	 	 0.023	 	 	 		 	 (0.117)	 	 	 	Moderates	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	Centre	Party	 	 	 0.036	 	 		 	 	 (0.336)	 	 	Liberals		 	 	 -0.220	 	 		 	 	 (0.273)	 	 	Christian	Democrats	 	 	 -0.535	 	 		 	 	 (0.362)	 	 	Greens	 	 	 -0.046	 	 		 	 	 (0.269)	 	 	Social	Democrats	 	 	 -0.061	 	 		 	 	 (0.183)	 	 	Left	Party	 	 	 0.231	 	 		 	 	 (0.261)	 	 	Feminist	Initiative	 	 	 -0.586	 	 		 	 	 (0.393)	 	 	Sweden	Democrats	 	 	 -0.171	 	 		 	 	 (0.189)	 	 	Other	 	 	 0.054	 	 		 	 	 (0.680)	 	 	
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Non-voter	 	 	 0.014	 	 		 	 	 (0.334)	 	 	None	of	the	above	 	 	 0.291	 	 		 	 	 (0.415)	 	 	No	right	to	vote	 	 	 0.383	 	 		 	 	 (0.349)	 	 	Don’t	know	 	 	 -0.855	 	 		 	 	 (0.559)	 	 	Don’t	want	to	say	 	 	 -0.127	 	 		 	 	 (0.259)	 	 	Elementary	school	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	Secondary	school	 	 	 	 -0.039	 		 	 	 	 (0.242)	 	Post-secondary	 	 	 	 -0.244	 		 	 	 	 (0.313)	 	Post-secondary	vocational	 	 	 	 0.253	 		 	 	 	 (0.293)	 	University,	1-2	years	 	 	 	 0.041	 		 	 	 	 (0.287)	 	University,	3-4	years	 	 	 	 0.242	 		 	 	 	 (0.246)	 	University,	5	years	or	more	 	 	 	 0.138	 		 	 	 	 (0.269)	 	Doctorate	 	 	 	 -0.052	 		 	 	 	 (0.628)	 	Rather	not	say	 	 	 	 0.185	 		 	 	 	 (0.681)	 	Working	full-time		 	 	 	 	 -0.180		 	 	 	 	 (0.322)	Working	part-time	(8-29	hours)	 	 	 	 	 -0.274		 	 	 	 	 (0.316)	Working	part-time	(less	than	8	hours)	 	 	 	 	 -0.974**		 	 	 	 	 (0.321)	Student	 	 	 	 	 0.436		 	 	 	 	 (0.291)	Pensioner	 	 	 	 	 -0.094		 	 	 	 	 (0.331)	Seeking	work	 	 	 	 	 0.207		 	 	 	 	 (0.431)	Does	not	work	at	all	 	 	 	 	 -0.021		 	 	 	 	 (0.583)	Constant	 0.112	 -0.036	 0.036	 -0.100	 0.114		 (0.182)	 (0.083)	 (0.134)	 (0.216)	 (0.318)	N	 2001	 2001	 2001	 2001	 2001	Log-likelihood	 -2229.086	 -2227.605	 -2217.779	 -2215.945	 -2217.863	*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001		
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Table	A8:	UK	-	treatment	group	balance		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)		 Age	 Gender	 Past	vote	 Education	 Work	status		 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	 b/se	
Negative	frame	group	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	Age	 0.000	 	 	 	 		 (0.003)	 	 	 	 	Female	 	 -0.063	 	 	 		 	 (0.095)	 	 	 	Conservative	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	Labour	 	 	 0.173	 	 		 	 	 (0.111)	 	 	Liberal	Democrat	 	 	 0.064	 	 		 	 	 (0.195)	 	 	Scottish	National	Party	(SNP)	 	 	 0.046	 	 		 	 	 (0.235)	 	 	Plaid	Cymru	 	 	 0.127	 	 		 	 	 (0.667)	 	 	UK	Independence	Party	(UKIP)	 	 	 -0.424	 	 		 	 	 (0.367)	 	 	Green	 	 	 -0.055	 	 		 	 	 (0.320)	 	 	Other	 	 	 0.330	 	 		 	 	 (0.390)	 	 	Don’t	know	 	 	 0.170	 	 		 	 	 (0.521)	 	 	Not	Asked	 	 	 0.120	 	 		 	 	 (0.170)	 	 	No	qualifications	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	Vocational	 	 	 	 -0.308	 		 	 	 	 (0.252)	 	Secondary	 	 	 	 -0.357	 		 	 	 	 (0.222)	 	Tertiary	 	 	 	 -0.244	 		 	 	 	 (0.214)	 	Don’t	know	 	 	 	 0.203	 		 	 	 	 (0.338)	 	Working	full-time	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	Working	part	time	(8-29	hours	a	week)	 	 	 	 	 -0.119		 	 	 	 	 (0.144)	Working	part	time	(Less	than	8	hours	a	week)	 	 	 	 	 0.152		 	 	 	 	 (0.387)	Full	time	student	 	 	 	 	 -0.192		 	 	 	 	 (0.214)	Retired	 	 	 	 	 -0.066	
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	 	 	 	 	 (0.120)	Unemployed	 	 	 	 	 0.409		 	 	 	 	 (0.316)	Not	working	 	 	 	 	 0.244		 	 	 	 	 (0.185)	Constant	 -0.024	 0.031	 -0.085	 0.254	 0.004		 (0.145)	 (0.070)	 (0.080)	 (0.204)	 (0.074)	
Positive	frame	group	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	Age	 0.001	 	 	 	 		 (0.003)	 	 	 	 	Female	 	 -0.105	 	 	 		 	 (0.095)	 	 	 	Conservative	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	Labour	 	 	 -0.011	 	 		 	 	 (0.111)	 	 	Liberal	Democrat	 	 	 -0.001	 	 		 	 	 (0.189)	 	 	Scottish	National	Party	(SNP)	 	 	 -0.444	 	 		 	 	 (0.264)	 	 	Plaid	Cymru	 	 	 -0.038	 	 		 	 	 (0.693)	 	 	UK	Independence	Party	(UKIP)	 	 	 -0.108	 	 		 	 	 (0.352)	 	 	Green	 	 	 -0.622	 	 		 	 	 (0.404)	 	 	Other	 	 	 0.074	 	 		 	 	 (0.428)	 	 	Don’t	know	 	 	 -0.221	 	 		 	 	 (0.524)	 	 	Not	Asked	 	 	 0.240	 	 		 	 	 (0.163)	 	 	No	qualifications	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	Vocational	 	 	 	 0.096	 		 	 	 	 (0.257)	 	Secondary	 	 	 	 -0.029	 		 	 	 	 (0.229)	 	Tertiary	 	 	 	 -0.186	 		 	 	 	 (0.224)	 	Don’t	know	 	 	 	 0.325	 		 	 	 	 (0.352)	 	Working	full-time	(ref.)	 	 	 	 	 	Working	part	time	(8-29	hours	a	week)	 	 	 	 	 -0.284		 	 	 	 	 (0.153)	Working	part	time	(Less	than	8	hours	a	week)	 	 	 	 	 0.349		 	 	 	 	 (0.406)	Full	time	student	 	 	 	 	 0.035	
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	 	 	 	 	 (0.208)	Retired	 	 	 	 	 0.041		 	 	 	 	 (0.119)	Unemployed	 	 	 	 	 0.534		 	 	 	 	 (0.296)	Not	working	 	 	 	 	 0.034		 	 	 	 	 (0.184)	Constant	 -0.060	 0.028	 -0.030	 0.045	 -0.027		 (0.147)	 (0.070)	 (0.078)	 (0.214)	 (0.075)	N	 3269	 3269	 3269	 3269	 3191	Log-likelihood	 -3538.654	 -3537.951	 -3528.958	 -3529.402	 -3446.214	*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001	Note:	Although	there	are	some	significant	results	in	these	tables,	for	example,	35-44-year-olds	in	Germany	are	more	likely	to	be	in	the	positive	frame	group,	these	do	not	affect	our	results	as	can	be	seen	when	we	control	for	these	variables	(see	Table	A1).	 	
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Table	A9.	Descriptive	statistics	–	Germany	(%)			 Negative	frame	 Positive	frame	 Control	group	
Age	 		 		 		18-24	 8.8	 7.8	 9.5	25-34	 14.6	 17	 16.3	35-44	 14.4	 15.2	 13.3	45-54	 18.3	 16.5	 18.8	Over	55	 44.1	 43.5	 42.1			 		 		 		Male	 47.2	 49	 50.3	Female	 52.8	 51	 49.7			 		 		 		
Past	vote	 		 		 		CDU/CSU	 28.2	 25.4	 24.6	SPD	 18.1	 17.9	 20.6	Die	Linke	 6.6	 6.5	 6.6	Grüne	 7.1	 6	 6.3	FDP	 4.3	 3.4	 3.2	AfD	 3.8	 3.6	 2.9	Other	 3.7	 4.9	 4.6	Non-voter	 28.3	 32.4	 31.1			 		 		 		No	qualifications	 3.7	 3.8	 4.4	Still	training	 2.4	 3.2	 2.6	Still	studying	 44.8	 4.6	 4	Vocational	degree	 59.1	 61.5	 59.6	University	degree	 30	 26.9	 29.4			 		 		 		Full-time	 38.04	 37.06	 35.7	P/T	8-29	hours	p/w	 8.71	 8.36	 9.25	P/T	less	than	8	hours	p/w	 0.89	 0.72	 0.85	Not	working	 52.36	 53.86	 54.2			 		 		 		
Anti-welfare	 		 		 		No	 49.5	 53.3	 52.9	Yes	 50.5	 46.7	 47.1			 		 		 		
Anti-immigration	 		 		 		No	 74.4	 75.1	 77	Yes	 25.6	 24.9	 23			 		 		 		
Economically	secure	 		 		 		Yes	 64	 62	 60	No	 36	 38	 40		Table	A10.	Descriptive	statistics	–	Sweden	(%)			 Negative	frame	 Positive	frame	 Control	group	Age	(mean)	 45.9	 46.3	 46.7	
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		 		 		 		Male	 49.2	 53.3	 53	Female	 50.8	 46.7	 47			 		 		 		
Past	vote	 		 		 		Moderates	 16.4	 17.5	 17.1	Centre	Party	 2.8	 3.6	 3.5	Liberals		 4.9	 6.2	 6.1	Christian	Democrats	 3.1	 2.3	 3.7	Greens	 5.5	 5.7	 5.6	Social	Democrats	 19.8	 19.9	 20.2	Left	Party	 5.7	 7.7	 5.4	Feminist	Initiative	 3.2	 2.1	 3.5	Sweden	Democrats	 20.9	 17.2	 18.1	Other	 1.5	 1.2	 1.5	Non-voter	 2.6	 3.8	 3.2	None	of	the	above	 1.4	 2.4	 1.8	No	right	to	vote	 4.1	 3.8	 2.6	Don’t	know	 1.2	 0.8	 1.6	Don’t	want	to	say	 6.9	 6	 6.3			 		 		 		Elementary	school	(ref.)	 7.06	 6.78	 7.3	Secondary	school	 33.9	 26.36	 31.09	Post-secondary	 5.83	 6.02	 7.3	Post-secondary	vocational	 10.43	 9.04	 8.03	University,	1-2	years	 8.74	 9.64	 9.2	University,	3-4	years	 19.63	 26.51	 22.04	University,	5	years	or	more	 11.81	 14.01	 12.85	Doctorate	 1.84	 0.9	 1.31	Rather	not	say	 0.77	 0.75	 0.88			 		 		 		Working	full-time	 54.6	 49	 48.8	Working	part-time	(8-29	hours)	 10.4	 10.1	 11.5	Working	part-time	(less	than	8	hours)	 4.1	 3.8	 6.7	Student	 9.2	 11.6	 8.8	Pensioner	 16.9	 19.6	 19.3	Seeking	work	 3.7	 4.5	 3.7	Does	not	work	at	all	 1.1	 1.4	 1.2			 		 		 		Anti-welfare	 		 		 		No	 57.8	 63.3	 60	Yes	 42.2	 36.7	 40			 		 		 		Anti-immigration	 		 		 		No	 69.6	 66	 71.2	Yes	 30.4	 34	 28.8			 		 		 		
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Economically	secure	 		 		 		Yes	 64.7	 61.7	 61.8	No	 35.3	 38.3	 38.2			Table	A11.	Descriptive	statistics	–	UK	(%)			 Negative	frame	 Positive	frame	 Control	group	Age	(mean)	 48.2	 48.5	 48.1	
        Male	 45.4	 46.2	 45.8	Female	 54.6	 53.8	 54.2			 		 		 		
Past	vote	2017	 		 		 		Conservative	 32.2	 36	 34.8	Labour	 38.8	 36	 36.4	Lib	Dem	 7.2	 7.5	 7.1	Scots	Nats.	 4.3	 2.7	 4.1	Plaid	Cymru	 0.6	 0.6	 0.5	UKIP	 1.5	 2	 2.2	Green	 2.1	 1	 2.1	Other	 1.6	 1.2	 1.2	Don't	know	 1.2	 1	 0.8	Not	asked	 10.4	 12.2	 10.9			 		 		 		No	qualifications	 6.8	 5.7	 4.78	Vocational	 10.3	 12.04	 10.46	Secondary	 29.6	 34.08	 32.46	Tertiary	 49.8	 45	 49.59	Don't	know	 3.6	 3.17	 2.71			 		 		 		Working	full	time	 41.77	 40.88	 41.54	Working	part	time	(8-29	hours	a	week)	 14.68	 11.94	 15.17	Working	part	time	(Less	than	8	hours)	 1.98	 1.91	 1.3	Full	time	student	 5.64	 6.59	 6.66	Retired	 23.8	 26.55	 25.35	Unemployed	 3.48	 3.72	 2.5	Not	working	 8.65	 8.4	 7.49			 		 		 		
Anti-welfare	 		 		 		No	 60	 62.6	 59.6	Yes	 40	 37.4	 40.4			 		 		 		
Anti-immigration	 		 		 		No	 67.9	 66.2	 67.6	Yes	 32.1	 33.8	 32.3			 		 		 		
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Economically	secure	 		 		 		Yes	 54.7	 51.9	 56.6	No	 45.3	 48.1	 43.4		 	
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Table	A12.	The	effect	of	framing	and	newspaper	readership		 Germany	 Sweden	 UK	No	Frame	(ref.)	 	 	 				Negative	frame	 -0.342***	(0.083)	 .9897	***	(.2842	)			 -.5545***	(.1039)				Positive	frame	 -0.114	(0.0879)	 -.2619	(.2505)				 -.1169	(.1025)	Anti-immigration	papers	 0.013	(0.120)	 	 -.4339***	(.1467)	Negative	frame*anti-immigration	papers	 -0.120	(0.178)	 	 -.3787	(.2138)	Positive	frame*anti-immigration	papers	 -0.092	(0.167)	 	 -.0801	(.1972)	Expressen	 	 .0226				(.0959)			 			Goteborg’s	Posten	 	 .0506					(.0873)					 			Svenska	Dagbladet	 	 -.1100			(.0937)					 		Negative	frame	X	Expressen	 	 -.0440			(.1331)	 	Positive	frame	X	Expressen	 	 -.0078				(.1252)			 	Negative	frame	X	Goteborg’s	Posten	 	 .1109					(.1156)		 	Positive	frame	X	Goteborg’s	Posten	 	 .0678				(.1095)						 	Negative	frame	X	Svenska	Dagbladet	 	 .0906				(.1208)					 	Positive	frame	X	Svenska	Dagbladet	 	 -.0422				(.1252)					 	Cut	1	 -0.594***	(0.058)	 -.5942			(.1768)																						-1.0598	(.0774)	Cut	2	 0.720***	(0.058)	 .6920				(.1784)																							-.0156	(.0734)	N	 4,158	 2001	 3269	Log-likelihood	 -4518.664	 -2152.365	 -3401.008			*P<0.05,	**p<0.01,	***p<0.001	Note:	Data	on	newspaper	readership	in	Sweden	is	on	a	scale	0-7	for	how	many	days	per	week	respondents	read	a	particular	paper.	The	three	papers	here	were	selected	as	being	more	associated	with	anti-immigration	messages.				 	
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Ethical	considerations		This	project	was	assessed	as	“minimal	risk”	following	the	risk	assessment	tool	at	[university	name	redacted	for	review].	The	Research	Ethics	Number	for	the	project	is	MR/16/17-370	[Note:	the	official	letter	of	confirmation	contains	details	of	the	researcher	which	would	compromise	the	anonymity	of	the	review	process.	This	can	be	provided	to	the	editor	on	request].			The	principal	ethical	consideration	with	the	project	was	whether	deception	would	be	used	in	either	the	negative	or	positive	frames.	However,	one	of	the	premises	of	the	project	is	that	the	impact	of	migrants	on	public	finances	is	contestable.	Before	fielding	the	experiments,	we	ensured	that	research	existed	that	would	support	the	interpretation	of	both	the	negative	and	positive	frames	in	each	country.	Put	simply,	we	found	credible	research	that	could	support	the	proposition	that	migrants	were	a	net	cost	to	the	public	purse	and	net	contributors	in	each	country.	As	a	result,	neither	the	respondents	in	the	negative	nor	the	positive	group	were	given	false	information.	Some	of	the	studies	used	as	the	evidential	basis	for	the	frames	in	each	country	are	provided	below.	Nevertheless,	all	respondents	in	each	country	were	also	informed	by	YouGov	immediately	after	the	survey	that	the	questions	relating	to	this	research	were	part	of	an	academic	experiment.				
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